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Cusenbary: A Trial Court's Refusal to Question Prospective Jurors about the

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Voir Dire-A Trial Court's Refusal
to Question Prospective Jurors About the Specific
Contents of Pretrial Publicity Which They Had Read or
Heard Did Not Violate a Defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to an Impartial Jury, or
Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process.
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S.

-,

111 S. Ct. 1899, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1991).
Dawud Majid Mu'Min escaped from a prison work detail' and went to a
nearby shopping center where he murdered a store owner.2 Substantial publicity preceded his trial, and on voir dire, eight of twelve venirepersons said
they had been exposed to news reports about the case. 3 Despite the defendant's objection, the trial judge denied individual voir dire and refused to ask
the venire specific questions regarding the contents of what they read or
heard about the case.4 However, all of the jurors collectively swore they
could be impartial.5 After the trial court found Mu'Min guilty of capital
murder, 6 he appealed claiming that the judge's preclusion of proposed voir
1. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. -, -, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1901, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493, 501
(1991). Mu'Min was an inmate at the Haymarket Correctional Unit in Virginia serving a
sentence of forty-eight years for first degree murder. He was assigned to the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) on work detail supervised by an employee of VDOT. Id.
2. Id. After stepping over a small perimeter fence Mu'Min walked about a mile to a retail
carpet store, where he asked the store owner about prices of oriental carpets. According to
Mu'Min, they argued about prices and the store owner called him "nigger," spit in his face,
and kicked him in the genitals. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 389 S.E.2d 886, 890 (Va. 1990), aff'd, 500
U.S -, Ill S. Ct. 1899, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1991).
3. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -_, 111 S. Ct. at 1902-03, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 502-03. Over fortyseven newspaper articles were submitted to the trial court in support of a motion for a change
of venue. These articles included discussions of Mu'Min's alleged confession of murder, his
rejection for parole six times, and alleged prison infractions. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1901, 114
L. Ed. 2d at 501.
4. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1902-03, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 502-03 (1991). See FED. R. CRIM. P.
24(a) (voir dire to be conducted as trial court "deems proper").
5. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1903, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 503. Potential jurors were
asked specific questions as to their ability to remain impartial and the judge removed four
venirepersons for cause. Id.
6. Id. At the time, the Virginia Code § 18.2-31 defined Capital murder, punishable as a
class one felony, as:
(c) The willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any person by a prisoner confined
in a state or local correctional facility as defined in 53.1-1, or while in the custody of
an employee thereof;
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dire questions entitled him to a new trial.7 The Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction and ruled that the accused did not have a constitutional right to ask the venire about the specific content of pretrial publicity
to which they have been exposed, but did have a constitutional right to know
whether a juror can remain impartial.' Mu'Min then petitioned for certio-

rari to the United States Supreme Court.9 Held-affirmed. A trial court's
refusal to question prospective jurors about the specific contents of pretrial
publicity which they had read or heard did not violate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury, or Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process.' °
The concern about protecting jurors from pretrial publicity emanates from
the basic premise that the accused has a right to a fair trial, which is guaranteed by the Constitution." The Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal
prosecutions an accused has the right to an impartial jury. 12 The concept

(d) The willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of a
robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie 1988). Mu'Min was sentenced to death for repeatedly
stabbing the store owner with a sharp instrument he made at the VDOT shop, robbing, and
disrobing her. Mu'Min, 389 S.E.2d at 889-90.
7. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at - Ill S. Ct. at 1903, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 503. Mu'Min did not
renew a previous motion for a change of venue nor had he previously objected to the composition of the jury. Id. Mu'Min relied on the Code of Virginia, section 8.01-358. Mu'Min, 389
S.E.2d at 892 n.5. The code provides:
The court and counsel for either party shall have the right to examine under oath any
person who is called as a juror therein and shall have the right to ask such person or juror
directly any relevant question to ascertain whether he is related to either party, or has an
interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or
prejudice therein; and the party objecting to any juror may introduce any competent evidence in support of the objection; and if it shall appear to the court that the juror does not
stand indifferent in the cause, another shall be drawn or called and placed in his stead for
the trial of that case. A juror, knowing anything relative to a fact in issue, shall disclose
the same in open court.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Michie 1984).
8. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1903, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 503.
9. Id.
10. Id. at -, IIl S. Ct. at 1908, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 509-10.
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (protects right to fair trial by impartial jury); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § I (protecting defendant's right to due process); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (defendant has right to impartial jury); Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354,
1361 (9th Cir. 1988) (Due Process Clause of Fourteenth amendment safeguards accused's
Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1, 50-52 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (defendant entitled to impartial jury); see also Norman L. McGill,
Note, Juror Impartiality-PrejudicialPublicity: The Supreme Court Makes the Doctrine of
Presumed Prejudice Unavailable to State Defendants on Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Patton v.
Yount, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 565, 567 (standard for determining impartiality established by
Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's trial).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
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that an individual has a fundamental right to a fair trial before an impartial
jury was firmly rooted in English common law and adopted by the first
Supreme Court of the United States.13 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no person be deprived of "[llife, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."' 4 Even though the United States

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have assistance of
counsel for his defence.
Id.; see, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988) (well settled that accused entitled to
impartial jury under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (even defendant charged with heinous crime has right to impartial jury); Harris, 885 F.2d at 1361 (accused's Sixth Amendment right to impartial jury protected by Due Process Clause of
Fourteenth amendment); see also James G. Bonebrake, Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments-The Lost Role of the Peremptory Challenge in Securing an Accused's Right to an Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 899, 900 (1988) (defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights unnecessarily jeopardized by decision in Ross). Justice Marshall dissented in Ross saying the Court was "condoning a scheme" to deprive defendant of Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury. Ross, 487 U.S. at 92 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Karen T. Grisez, Note,
Ross v. Oklahoma: A Reversal of the Reversible-Error Standard in Death-Qualification Cases,
38 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 883 (1989) (peremptory challenges developed to secure Sixth
Amendment guarantees).
13. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722; see Spies v. People, 123 U.S. 131, 167-68 (1888) (trial by impartial jury fundamental right); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878) (juror who
has formed strong opinion may bias trial); see also Samuel Rosenthal & Michelle Rice, Whittling Away the Right to Counsel: The Supreme Court's New Approach to the Sixth Amendment,
3 CRIM. JusT. 2, 3 (1989) (Court's definition of right to impartial jury narrowly defined). See
generally FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 28-29
(1968) (Sixth Amendment mechanism for procedural safeguards).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section one which constitutes the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.; see Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 189 (1981) (where accused and victim
members of different races, inquiry as to racial prejudice may be required by Constitution);
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 315 (1931) (reversible error for court not to ask about
racial bias); Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895) (inquiry permissible to determine if juror holds opinion or prejudice); see also Stanton D. Krauss, Comment, Representing
the Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64
IND. L.J. 617, 618 (1989) (constitutional limitations on practice of death-qualification determination in jury selection); Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due Process Among
the States? Pretrial Publicity and Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17
AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 175-76 (1990) (fair trial requires jurors be free of outside influences).
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Supreme Court has ruled that the limited incorporation of the Sixth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to employ
juries in criminal proceedings, every state has provided for them in felony
trials. 5 Historically, the Court has applied the Fourteenth Amendment's

Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment simultaneously to achieve
the definition of "impartial jury."' 6
To protect the defendant's right to an impartial jury, the trial court conducts voir dire examination by questioning prospective jurors.' 7 Trial judges

have traditionally been afforded broad discretion in conducting voir dire because of the subjective nature of jury selection.'" Although trial judges in
both state and federal courts have broad discretion to choose the method of

15. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 721; see Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 266 (1947) (state's use of
jury trials not demanded by Fourteenth Amendment); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324
(1937) (jury trials not required in state's criminal procedure); see also COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 578579 (1959) (states universally adopted right to trial by jury); Developments in the Law-The
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1326-32 (1982) (states'
bills of rights mirror Constitution).
16. See, e.g., Ross, 487 U.S. at 85 (Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee defendant facing death penalty right to impartial jury); Harris, 885 F.2d at 1361 (standards which
govern change of venue derive from Due Process Clause which safeguards defendant's Sixth
Amendment right); Bailey v. Delaware, 490 A.2d 158, 162 (Del. 1984) (Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide for impartial jury); see also Norman L. McGill, Note, Juror Impartiality-Prejudicial Publicity: The Supreme Court Makes the Doctrine of Presumed Prejudice Unavailable to State Defendants on Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Patton v. Yount, 1985 S.ILL. U.
L.J. 565, 570 (Sixth Amendment not per se applicable to states, so accused contends trial court
violated Fourteenth Amendment right to due process). But see Buxton S. Copeland, Note,
Criminal Procedure-Motion for a Change of Venue-In Search of a Guiding Light-State v.
Jerrett, 7 CAMPBELL L. REV. 73, 74 (1984) (denial of motion infringed upon defendant's Sixth
Amendment Rights).
17. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 n.13 (1984) (voir dire long recognized as
effective method to root out bias when conducted in careful and thorough manner); RosalesLopez, 451 U.S. at 188 (adequate voir dire serves to discover juror bias and provides counsel
with tool for intelligent use of peremptory challenges); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162,
171-72 (1950) (right to impartial jury guaranteed by voir dire because defendant may expose
prospective juror's bias); see also Peter D. O'Connell, Pretrial Publicity, Change of Venue,
Public Opinion Polls-A Theory of Procedural Justice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 169, 173 (1988)
(voir dire preferred way to judge effect of pretrial publicity on community); Rodney L. LaGrone et al., Project, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 1988-1989, 78 GEO. L.J. 699, 1116 (1990) (voir dire
secures right to impartial jury).
18. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038 (good reasons to apply presumption of correctness to
trial court's decision); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 503-511
(1984) (court's resolution entitled special deference); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 156 (trial court decision should not be put aside unless manifest error shown). See generally, 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 22.2 at 763 n.5 (1984) (notion that
administration of justice is in community's hands based on premise that jurors strive for fairness); John A. Burgess, Note, The Efficacy of a Change of Venue in Protecting a Defendant's
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jury selection,' 9 the responsibility of impaneling unbiased jurors falls primarily on the judge, who decides what questions may be asked on voir dire.2 °
The judge then weighs the jurors' answers and the total demeanor of the
venirepersons to evaluate impartiality.2
Pretrial publicity presents a challenge to a trial judge who must balance
the interest of the state in trying the case in the county of the alleged crime,
and the right of the accused to an unbiased jury.2 2 Protecting the right to an

Right to an ImpartialJury, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 925, 941-42 (1967) (courts not inclined
to use change of venue to solve prejudicial publicity problems).
19. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038 (demeanor plays important role in judge's evaluating
jurors); cf Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 1968) (content questioning required); Scott Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an ImpartialJury:
Resolving the Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730 n.5 (1985)
(same standards for federal trials as for state trials); Norman L. McGill, Note, JurorImpartiality--PrejudicialPublicity: The Supreme Court Makes the Doctrineof Presumed Prejudice Unavailable to State Defendants on Habeas Corpus Proceedings,Patton v. Yount, 1985 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 565, 579-80 (latitude given trial court grants judge almost unlimited discretion).
20. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 195 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (would allow trial
judge to determine method of voir dire on case by case basis instead of adopting rule); Ristaino
v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (Constitution does not entitle accused to have specific questions posed during voir dire); cf Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (court retained
discretionary authority over method of questioning even though required to ask racial bias
questions). See generaly Peter D. O'Connell, PretrialPublicity, Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls-A Theory of ProceduralJustice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 169, 182 (1988) (methodology
for determining impartiality not chained to artificial formula but left to trial judge's discretion); Rodney L. LaGrone et al., Project, Nineteenth Annual Review of CriminalProcedure:
United States Supreme Court and Courts ofAppeals, 1988-1989, 78 GEo. L.J. 699, 1116 (1990)
(trial court may choose most effective method to conduct voir dire).
21. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 337 (1988) (trial court's judgment not to be
lightly disturbed); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86-87 (1976) (judge not just moderator, but governor of trial responsible for assuring proper conduct); Montana v. Link, 640 P.2d
366, 368 (Mont. 1981) (trial judge allowed discretion to conduct voir dire in appropriate manner); Rodney L. LaGrone et al., Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 1988-1989, 78 GEO. L.J. 699, 1116-17 (1990)
(trial judge determines what questions asked and may examine individually or as group);
Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due Process among the States? PretrialPublicity and Motions for Change of Venue in CriminalProceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 188-89
(1990) (format of voir dire important because jurors questioned as a group are less likely to
disclose their prejudice).
22. See Fisher v. Mississippi, 481 So.2d 203, 216 (Miss. 1985) (interest state may have
may be legitimate, but subordinate to defendant's right to fair trial); In Re Brown, 478 So.2d
1033, 1037 (Miss. 1985) (state's pragmatic interests sacrificed for accused's fundamental
rights); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2) (1988) (court may use discretion to exclude prospective
juror for inability to be impartial); Peter D. O'Connell, PretrialPublicity, Change of Venue,
Public Opinion Polls-A Theory of ProceduralJustice, 65 U. DET. L. REv. 169, 184 (1988)
(subtle issue is question of how judge determines if juror biased); cf David Suggs & Bruce D.
Sales, JurorSelf Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 271
(1981) (voir dire practices not conducive to juror self-disclosure).
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impartial jury through voir dire has become problematic because of the recent advent of rapid and comprehensive news coverage and public interest in
criminal cases. 2a Constitutional protection of the right to an impartial jury
does not require that jury members know nothing about the case, only that
they be able to judge the case impartially.2 4
Since a federal court will intervene in a state court's proceeding only when
a defendant demonstrates deprivation of a constitutional guarantee, analysis
of pretrial publicity and the jury begins with standards defined by the United
States Supreme Court.25 The standards which guide state judges in voir dire
questioning remain in flux because the Supreme Court has refused to apply
Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment analysis to this issue.26 The Court instead

23. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981) (highly publicized trial poses risk
of compromised right to fair trial); Colorado v. McCrary, 549 P.2d 1320, 1325 (Colo. 1976)
(public interest keen in criminal cases so that qualified jurors likely to know about case); Ford
v. Nevada, 717 P.2d. 27, 30 (Nev. 1986) (jurors will know high profile criminals because of
"realities of our age"); see also Hans Ziesel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory
Challenges on Jury & Verdict: An Experiment in a FederalDistrict Court, 30 STAN. L. REV.
491, 528-29 (1978) (experiment suggests voir dire not sufficient to identify prejudiced jurors);
Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due Process among the States? PretrialPublicity and Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 176
(1990) (rapid dissemination of criminal trial news coverage problematic to seating unbiased
jurors).
24. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 85 (claim that jury not impartial must focus on seated jurors);
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (not required that jurors be totally ignorant of case); United States v.
Glaze, 866 F.2d 253, 254 (8th Cir. 1989) (ongoing publicity not sufficient to claim impartial
jury unless jurors shown to be impartial). See generally Ralph Frasca, Estimating the Occurrence of Trials Prejudicedby Press Coverage, 72 JUDICATURE 162, 162 (1988) (disqualification
of upstanding citizens because they read or heard about case would leave ignorant to serve);
James G. Bonebrake, Note, Sixth & FourteenthAmendments-The Lost Role of The Peremptory Challenge in Securing an Accused's Right to an Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 899, 903 (1988) (loss of peremptory challenge did not violate Sixth Amendment
right).
25. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 721; see Fay, 332 U.S. at 266 (state's use of jury trials not demanded
by Fourteenth Amendment); Palko, 302 U.S. at 324 (jury trials not required in state's criminal
procedure); cf Norman L. McGill, Note, Juror Impartiality---PrejudicialPublicity: The
Supreme Court Makes the Doctrine of Presumed Prejudice Unavailable to State Defendants on
Habeas Corpus Proceedings,Patton v. Yount, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 565, 570 (Sixth Amendment
not per se applicable to states); Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due Process
Among the States? PretrialPublicity and Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 175 (1990) (courts and commentators disagree on Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments' application to state proceedings);.
26. See Crawford v. Georgia, 489 U.S. 1040, 1041 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (standard of review so hard to satisfy it violates any notion of due process); Brecheen v. Oklahoma,
485 U.S. 909, 911-12 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that states have diverged in wake
of Supreme Court vacuum); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 804 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (conviction stands because circumstances at trial do not rise to due process violation);
see also Norman L. McGill, Note, Juror Impartiality-PrejudicialPublicity: The Supreme
Court Makes the Doctrine of Presumed Prejudice Unavailable to State Defendants on Habeas
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has ruled that the accused is simply entitled to a fair trial, and unless the
trial court's failure to ask specific questions renders the trial fundamentally
unfair, such questions are not constitutionally required.27 Although the
Supreme Court has been more sensitive to the constitutional issue of voir
dire questioning where race is a factor, it has offered few specific
guidelines.2 8
The lack of standards promulgated by the Supreme Court has caused a
split in the lower courts as to minimum requirements for change of venue
where pretrial publicity may threaten guarantees derived from the Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment.2 9 Some jurisdictions apply the "inherent

Corpus Proceedings,Patton v. Yount, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 565, 573 (fair trial standard tends to
presume correctness of state trial court's decision); Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due ProcessAmong the States? PretrialPublicity and Motions for Change of Venue in
CriminalProceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 178 (1990) (courts argue whether the Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment allows change of venue, but merely employ "fair trial" standard).
27. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189 (trial judge must use discretion in questioning
jurors); cf Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 311 (reversible error for court not to ask question that covered
racial bias subject); Connors, 158 U.S. at 413 (suitable inquiry permissible at trial judges' discretion). See generally VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 57-58 (1986)
(local jurors know local norms of conduct conducive to fair trial); Norman L. McGill, Note,
Publicity: The Supreme Court Makes the Doctrine of Presumed
Juror Impartiality-Prejudicial
Prejudice Unavailable to State Defendants on Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Patton v. Yount,
1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 565, 570 (manifest error only standard to set aside judge's ruling).
28. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189 (where defendant and victim are different races
inquiry about racial prejudice required); Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 594 (Constitution does not require racial inquiry in every case involving black defendant); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S.
524, 527 (1973) (risk of prejudice against black defendant charged with killing white victim
great enough that Due Process Clause requires racial prejudice inquiry); cf.Aldridge, 283 U.S.
at 311 (reversible error not to ask racial bias question because trial court failed to "cover the
subject"); Peter D. O'Connell, PretrialPublicity, Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls-A
Theory of ProceduralJustice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 171, 176 (1988) (decision to grant change of
venue dependent on facts of specific case); Rodney L. LaGrone et al., Project, Nineteenth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals,
1988-1989, 78 GEO. L.J. 699, 1116 (1990) (voir dire examination required to discover potential
bias).
29. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1987) (inquiry should be whether jury
composition affected as a whole). But see Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (Court
retreats from Gray analysis); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (right to challenge
only impaired if defendant does not receive what state law provides). Compare United States
v. Vest, 842 F.2d 1319, 1332-33 (1st Cir. 1988) (mixed collective and individual voir dire no
abuse of discretion where publicity not widespread and jurors not reluctant to admit knowledge of case) and United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 971-72 (3d Cir. 1985) (no error
because exhaustive voir dire adequate to overcome extensive inflammatory pretrial publicity)
with Jordan v. Lippman, 763 F.2d 1265, 1279-81 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (individual voir dire required
where newspapers carried sensational reports) and United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 196
(5th Cir. 1978) (individual voir dire required where coverage inflammatory and emphasized
racial overtones). See generally Rodney L. LaGrone et al., Project, Nineteenth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 1988-1989, 78
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prejudice," or "actual prejudice" standard which requires the defendant to
show that a fair trial is virtually impossible or that seated jurors were unable
to remain impartial.3 ° Trial judges will grant very few motions for a change
in venue by application of this standard and appeals courts remain reticent
to overrule them.3 The presumption in the state courts is that the judge is
in the best position to impanel an impartial jury.32 Therefore, unless the
defendant can prove that pretrial publicity was inherently prejudicial, that is,

GEO. L.J. 699, 1116-17 (1990) (trial court has broad discretion to determine best method of
conducting voir dire); Norman L. McGill, Note, Juror Impartiality-Prejudicial Publicity:
The Supreme Court Makes the Doctrine of Presumed Prejudice Unavailable to State Defendants
on Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Patton v. Yount, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 565, 573 (convictions
under state proceedings must meet higher burden of proof than federal appeals because defendant must show actual prejudice by jury or that trial setting "inherently prejudicial").
30. See Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 803 (1975) (defendant must show that trial
setting "inherently prejudicial" or that jury-selection process permits inference of actual prejudice); Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11 th Cir. 1988) (prejudicial publicity analyzed
under two standards, "presumed prejudice" and "actual prejudice"); Connecticut v. Townsend, 558 A.2d 669, 674-75 (Conn. 1989) (defendant must generally prove actual juror prejudice except in "extreme circumstances" where inherent prejudicial publicity requires presumed
prejudice); Constance M. Jones, Comment, Appellate Review of Criminal Change of Venue
Rulings: The Demise of California's Reasonable Likelihood Standard, 71 CAL. L. REV. 703,
704 (1983) (prejudicial publicity analyzed under different standards, "presumed prejudice"
and "actual prejudice"); Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due Process Among
the States? Pretrial Publicity and Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17
AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 179 (1990) (defendant in habeas corpus proceeding may show state
denied change of venue because pretrial publicity created "actual prejudice" or "inherent
prejudice").
31. See Arizona v. Befford, 754 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Ariz. 1988) (change of venue granted
only in "unusual circumstances"); New Jersey v. Gary, 550 A.2d 1259, 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988) (appeals for claim of prejudicial voir dire "rare indeed"); State v. Thompson,
292 S.E.2d 581, 585 (S.C.) (only "extraordinary circumstances" would cause ruling for motion
to change venue because of pretrial publicity), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982); J. Skelly
Wright, Fair Trial-Free Press, 38 F.R.D. 435, 435-437 (1966) (Sixth Amendment rights violated in very few cases so dismissal of those few cases necessary to administer justice); Constance M. Jones, Comment, Appellate Review of Criminal Change of Venue Rulings: The
Demise of California's Reasonable Likelihood Standard, 71 CAL. L. REV. 703, 705 (1983)
(court limits trial judges to actual prejudice standard unless public sentiment so inflamed as to
make fair trial "impossible").
32. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986) (court retains discretion over
method of questioning); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 195 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) (trial judge should determine questioning on case by case basis); Cummings v.
Dugger, 862 F.2d 1504, 1508 (11th Cir. 1989) (no abuse of discretion to screen jurors individually before group questioning); see also MARC A. FRANKLIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
THE FOURTH ESTATE 185 (1977) (jurors who may have learned inadmissible evidence outside

courtroom may present problem of prejudicial bias); Alice M. Padawer-Singer & Allen H.
Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror's Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA-A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 125, 135 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975) (jurors exposed to

inadmissible evidence outside courtroom found defendant guilty in eighty percent of cases).
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so inflammatory as to preclude an impartial jury, deference is shown to the
trial judge's decision. 3 While trial courts rarely find inherent prejudice,34
the subjective nature of this test is apparent from the variety of language
used among the jurisdictions."
Other jurisdictions use the "reasonable likelihood" standard, which the

33. Compare Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 192-94 (Constitution does not require inquiry
into racial bias by state court, but federal court must allow if basis for prejudice present) and
United States v. Casey, 835 F.2d 148, 152 (7th Cir. 1987) (no abuse of discretion where judge
refused individual voir dire when no climate of racial tension) with Davis v. Florida, 473 U.S.
913, 914 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting in mem. opinion to denial of cert.) (Court should
address whether, and on what grounds individual voir dire required) and United States v.
Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1047 (4th Cir. 1977) (trial court erred in refusing to question jurors
individually on capacity). See generally John E. Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal
Defendant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 68 (1971) (no "mathematical formula" for trial judges because Court sees danger in "hard and fast" rules concerning defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights in state court); Michael J. Whellan, Note,
What's Happenedto Due ProcessAmong the States? PretrialPublicity and Motionsfor Change
of Venue in CriminalProceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 178 (1990) (confusion surrounding
motions for change of venue stems from broad, indeterminate language of Fourteenth Amendment which encourages judges' imprecise discretion).
34. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 565 (1965) (prejudice found even though some television cameras present in court); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1964) (prejudice
found where deputies drove jurors to lodgings even though did not discuss trial); Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963) (Court refused to even look at voir dire record before
ruling prejudice where video from jail broadcast in community); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
725 (1961) (wave of public passion caused presumption of prejudice). The "presumed prejudice" language is still used and upheld by the Court. See Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487,
1489-91 (11 th Cir. 1985) (prejudice presumed where defendant made proper showing that pretrial publicity justified presumption), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); see also MARC A.
FRANKLIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE 185 (1977) (prejudice presumed where jurors learn evidence outside courtroom); Alice M. Padawer-Singer & Allen H.
Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Juror's Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA-A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 135 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975) (courts rarely find inherent
prejudice despite fact that test results suggest that most jurors exposed to pretrial publicity
found defendant guilty).
35. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (judge may sequester jury to
remedy prejudice); Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1980) (presumed prejudice
rarely applicable unless extremely inflammatory publicity saturates community) cert. denied,
481 U.S. 913 (1981); Arizona v. Smith, 774 P.2d 811, 816 (Ariz. 1989) (inherent prejudice
standard applies only where pretrial publicity creates "carnival atmosphere" of Sheppard and
defendant "probably" deprived of fair trial); Pennsylvania v. Romeri, 470 A.2d 498, 501 n. 1
(Pa. 1983) (inherent prejudice vague concept depending on effect of publicity in community),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984). Commentators as well as judges find these standards problematic. Compare Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due Process Among the
States? PretrialPublicity and Motionsfor Change of Venue in CriminalProceedings, 17 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 175, 183 (1990) (Patton v. Yount reinforced idea that as long as jurors can "lay aside"
their bias trial should proceed) with Norman L. McGill, Note, JurorImpartiality-Prejudicial
Publicity: The Supreme Court Makes the Doctrine of Presumed Prejudice Unavailable to State
Defendants on Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Patton v. Yount, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 565, 577-78
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Supreme Court developed primarily in the sixties, to find inherent prejudice. 36 Using this more liberal standard, the defendant does not have to
prove from voir dire records that seated jurors were biased, or that the trial
setting was so inflammatory as to render a fair trial impossible.37 Instead,
the trial court will look to the totality of circumstances to determine if pretrial publicity has prejudiced the jury. 38 The reasoning behind the standard
is that jurors who say they can remain impartial may consciously or subconsciously draw upon all of their life experience, including prejudicial bias,
when deciding the case. 39 There is a broad range of application of the "rea-

(Court applied "manifest error" standard to question as to entire jury's impartiality but applied "fair support" standard to impartiality question regarding two individual jurors).
36. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363 ("reasonable likelihood" standard first mentioned); In
Re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d. 603, 610-12 (2d Cir. 1988) (reasonable likelihood of prejudice permitted use of gag order when no effective alternatives found). But see
Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802 (Court used "totality of circumstances" language instead of "reasonable likelihood" language). Although commentators disagree as to the effect of the Murphy
decision, the "reasonable likelihood" language is still used in many jurisdictions. See Michael
J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due Process Among the States? PretrialPublicity and
Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 182 (1990)
(Murphy abandoned "reasonable likelihood" standard and Court missed opportunity to further develop or establish new standard). But see Peter D. O'Connell, Pretrial Publicity,
Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls-A Theory of ProceduralJustice, 65 U. DET. L. REV.
169, 179 (1988) (A.B.A. Standard 8-3.3(b) (2d ed. 1978)) requires that judge grant change of
venue request when "substantial likelihood" accused did not receive fair trial); Constance M.
Jones, Comment, Appellate Review of CriminalChange of Venue Rulings: The Demise of California's Reasonable Likelihood Standard, 71 CAL. L. REV. 703, 711 (1983) (standard of proof
defendant should meet is "reasonable likelihood" that pretrial publicity prejudiced
proceedings).
37. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802 (court may ignore juror's claims of impartiality and
draw inference of prejudice); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728 (court may infer prejudice when many
jurors admit prejudice); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2) (1982) (court may excuse prospective
juror for failure to render impartial service).
38. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803 (inference of actual prejudice permitted if trial setting
inherently prejudicial); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363 (Court found inherent prejudice using "reasonable likelihood" standard); New Jersey v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 652 (N.J. 1983) (constitutional requirement for jury to be "free of outside influences"); see also AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS

22 (1968) (judge

must grant change of venue if "substantial likelihood" jury decision influenced by media coverage); Peter D. O'Connell, PretrialPublicity, Change of Venue, Public Opinion Polls-A Theory
of ProceduralJustice, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 169, 170 (1988) (traditional standard for determining motions for change of venue is "actual prejudice" or "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice).
39. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802 (even if jurors say they can be impartial, court may
ignore these "indicia of impartiality"); Irvin, 366 U.S. at, 728 (where many jurors admit prejudice, jurors statement of impartiality must be given "little weight"); Romeri, 470 A.2d at 503
(publicity saturating community may cause unfair trial despite juror's good intentions to set
aside what they read or heard); see also Dale W. Broeder, Voir DireExaminations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 508-10 (1965) (experiment suggesting jurors unwilling to
portray themselves as unfair or biased); Herald P. Fahringer, In the Valley of the Blind: A
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sonable likelihood" test, which leaves states free to adopt any standard more
liberal than the "inherent prejudice" standard.' Procedures requiring content questioning of jurors exposed to pretrial publicity are promulgated more
frequently in jurisdictions using a "reasonable likelihood" standard. 4 '
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether trial courts must ask
jurors exposed to pretrial publicity content questions as to what they read or
heard in Mu'Min v. Virginia.4 2 The Court held in Mu'Min that a trial
court's refusal to question prospective jurors about the specific contents of
pretrial publicity which they had read or heard did not violate a defendant's
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment or Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury.4 3 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
ruled that the Due Process Clause does not reach as far as requiring specific
questioning on voir dire and ruled that the trial court acted in compliance
with the Fourteenth Amendment. ' The Court concluded that a trial
court's findings of juror impartiality may not be overturned except
for "man45
ifest error" that rendered the trial "fundamentally unfair."
Primer on Jury Selection in a Criminal Case, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 116, 117 (1980)
(jurors reluctant to disclose bias).
40. Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 535 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Mass. 1989) (change of venue not
required because no substantial risk of extraneous influences existed); Lutes v. Mississippi, 517
So.2d 541, 545 (Miss. 1987) (reasonably likely that publicity prejudiced trial); New Jersey v.
Biegenwald, 524 A.2d 130, 142 (N.J. 1987) (realistic likelihood that trial prejudiced by publicity); see also Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, PretrialPublicity in Criminal Case as Groundfor
Change of Venue, 33 A.LR. 3d 17, 38-39 (1970) (list of cases decided on "reasonable likelihood" standard). California adopted the "reasonable likelihood" standard in Maine v. Superior Court and encouraged other courts to do likewise. See Maine v. Superior Court, 438 P.2d
372, 377 (Cal. 1968) (delineating more specific standards of reasonableness appropriate). For a
discussion of Maine, see Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due Process Among
the States? PretrialPublicity and Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17
AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 186 (1990) (reasonable likelihood rule protects defendant from hidden
bias).
41. See Davis, 583 F.2d at 196-98 (cursory questioning insufficient where nature of publicity raised significant possibility of prejudice); United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d 1299, 1303
(9th Cir. 1971) (sequestered voir dire recommended where prejudicial pretrial publicity); Louisiana v. Goodson, 412 So.2d 1077, 1081 (La. 1982) (content questioning as method for screening juror bias); Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System on the "Free Press-FairTrial" Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519, 532-33 (1980) (individual
voir dire including content questioning required where "substantial likelihood" publicity
prejudiced trial).
42. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. ...
111 S. Ct 1899, 1903, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493, 501
(1991).
43. Id. at -, I11 S. Ct. at 1908, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 510.
44. See id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1903, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 503 (inquiry left to trial court's
"sound discretion"). The Court stated that a defendant has no constitutional right to explore
the content of information acquired by jurors because much discretion is afforded trial judges
who have the responsibility of impaneling impartial juries. Id.
45. See id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1905, 1907-08, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 506, 508-10 (Due Process
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The majority reached its narrow interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment by ruling that the trial court was not faced with such a "wave of public
passion" as to require more extensive juror examination under the Due Process Clause.46 The Court distinguished prior case law4 7 by stating that
Mu'Min's trial was not confronted with a "wave of public passion" which
would raise the presumption that jurors could not remain impartial despite
their statements to the contrary.48 Justice Rehnquist stated that content
questions concerning racial bias may sometimes be required to "cover the
subject" during voir dire, but said "we were careful not to specify the particulars" of such questioning.49 The opinion mentioned that group questioning
about publicity might be harmful to the defendant, because the jurors would
be exposed to publicity to which they might not otherwise have been exposed.5 ° Because publicity would be communicated to the other panel members, the Court noted that individual questioning would be required, but
concluded only that content questioning was not constitutionally required. 5
The opinion rejected the American Bar Association's guideline which requires content questioning where there is a "substantial possibility" jurors
will be biased by pretrial publicity.5 2
The Court recognized that voir dire serves two purposes: to provide an

Clause does not reach as far as to require individual voir dire by trial court). The Court
distinguished other cases in which specific individual questioning was required and rejected the
A.B.A. "substantial possibility" standard. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1907-08, 114 L. Ed. 2d at
508-09.
46. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at , Ill S. Ct. at 1907, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 508 (even though
eight of twelve jurors knew about the case, they claimed collectively to be impartial).
47. See id. at -I, Ill S. Ct. at 1906, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 506 (distinguishing Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 725 (1961) where build-up of prejudice was clear and convincing).
48. See id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1907, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 507-08 (recognizing pretrial publicity can be so inflammatory as to require questioning, but instant case in Washington, D.C.,
where murders commonplace).
49. See id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1905, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 505 (noting "commonsense appeal"
to argument that content questions help in peremptory challenges, but that does not make it
required by Constitution). The Court implied that an individual voir dire requirement would
be burdensome to courts and that requiring the content questioning to groups of jurors might
"do more harm than good." See id.at -, Ill S. Ct. at 1904-05, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 505 (accepting petitioner's claim would require individual voir dire).
50. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -.
, 111 S. Ct. at 1905, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 505 (individual
questioning of jurors required to avoid transmission of pretrial publicity descriptions to group).
51. See id. (accepting petitioner's claim would require individual interrogation of each
potential juror).
52. Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1907-08, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 509. Justice O'Connor wrote a
concurring opinion in Mu'Min, which did not vary substantially from the analysis of the majority. Id. at -,111 S.Ct. at 1908, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 510 (O'Connor, J., concurring). It may be
significant from the standpoint that her opinion mentioned the Sixth Amendment rather than
the Fourteenth, which the majority stressed in the conclusion. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)
(court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment right).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss2/9

12

Cusenbary: A Trial Court's Refusal to Question Prospective Jurors about the

1991]

CASENOTES

impartial jury, and to help counsel utilize peremptory challenges.

3

The ma-

jority conceded that content questions may help counsel to strike prospective

jurors, but, however helpful, peremptory challenges are not constitutionally

required.5 4 Therefore, the majority reasoned, the defendant has no right to

ask jurors about what they have read or heard since the defendant is only
entitled to know if a juror can remain impartial despite publicity."
Justice Marshall, writing for the dissent, rejected the majority's interpretation of the Due Process Clause and stated the Sixth Amendment right to an

impartial jury was a "hollow formality"

6

because merely asking jurors if

they can remain impartial is not enough." He criticized the majority's anal-

ysis by rejecting the reasoning that publicity was not as widespread in
Mu'Min as in other cases, because two-thirds of the jury knew about the
case.5" Justice Marshall further argued that the racial bias cases were not
controlling because Mu'Min was a case of first impression. 9 He contended
that content questions must be asked in cases involving extensive pretrial
publicity for three reasons. 60 First, content questions are necessary to determine if the type of information the jurors were exposed to would disqualify
them as a matter of law. 6' Second, asking the questions individually would

lend more legal depth to the trial court's finding of impartiality because jurors may be unaware they are biased. 62 Third, content questioning facilitates trial court fact finding because evidence is garnered at trial, not outside
the courtroom.6 3

53. See id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1908, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (voir dire serves dual purpose in
enabling court to assist counsel in exercising challenges and to select impartial jury).
54. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1905, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 505,
55. See id. at - 111 S. Ct. at 1903, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 503 ("content" questions might be
helpful in determination of impartiality, but not enough to make them constitutionally
required).
56. Id. at , Il1 S. Ct. at 1909, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 511 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. See id. at -, Ill1 S. Ct. at 1910, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 511 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(pretrial publicity had caused statements such as "[tlhe world's in an uproar" in community
which learned from papers that Mu'Min confessed to killing and raping woman).
58. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, I llS. Ct. at 1910-11, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 511-12 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (eight of twelve jurors said they had read or heard something about the case).
59. See id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1912-13, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Court misses point by comparing racial bias questions, meaningful examination of jury necessary to guarantee right to impartial jury).
60. Id. at -, Ill1 S. Ct. at 1913, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 516 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (since
defendant bears burden of proving impartiality, it is imperative that defendant be entitled to
meaningful examination).
61. Id, at - 111 S.Ct. at 1913, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 516 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (certain
circumstances require determination that juror not impartial despite assertion to contrary).
62. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1914, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 517 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (issue of impartiality mixed one of law and fact).
63. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1915, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 517 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (if trial
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Justice Kennedy, in a separate dissent, proposed a three-part test in cases
where defendants claim prejudice from pretrial publicity."' He suggested
that the United States Supreme Court should first examine whether the atmosphere at trial was so corruptive that the defendant was denied a fair
trial.6 5 The second consideration should be whether any seated jurors actually were not impartial,6 6 and finally, whether the trial judge conducted an
adequate examination to determine if jurors can "lay aside" pretrial publicity." Kennedy concluded that the trial setting in Mu'Mn was not so corruptive as to deny Mu'Min an impartial trial, but that examination was
insufficient because group questioning permitted jurors to merely remain silent about bias.6 8
In Mu'Min, the Court declined to set minimum standards for voir dire
which would guarantee a defendant's right to due process and a fair trial
under the Sixth Amendment.6 9 By allowing trial court judges "ample discretion" in conducting voir dire, jurisdictions will continue to be split as to
what type of questioning is required where pretrial publicity may prejudice
the proceedings. 7 ° The determination of whether it was "manifest error" for
court refuses to develop background of impartiality its finding of impartiality does not merit
deference).
64. Id. at -I, 111 S. Ct. at 1917-19, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 520-23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1917, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 521 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (instant
case does not fall into this category).
66. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -I, 111 S. Ct at 1918, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 522 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. at -,111 S. Ct at 1918, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 523 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at -I, 111 S. Ct. at 1918-19, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 522-23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. -, -, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1908, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493,
509 (1991) (Court careful not to specify particulars of how this could be done); see also Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 311 (1931) (court's voir dire questioning must "cover the
subject" of possible racial bias). See generally United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 461, 464-66
(6th Cir. 1988) (discretion not abused in dismissing juror when juror had friendly conversation
with defendant and his wife); United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1987)
(abuse of discretion in denying motion for mistrial because sleeping juror missed testimony);
United States v. Molinares Charris, 822 F.2d 1213, 1222-23 (Ist Cir. 1987) (no abuse of discretion in excusing juror who was having nervous problems when judge determined health risk
too great); United States v. Jonas, 786 F.2d 1019, 1023 (11th Cir. 1986) (no abuse of discretion
in allowing juror who said midway through trial that his "mind was made up" about case, to
continue after court received juror's assurance that he could be impartial).
70. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -_, I1I S. Ct. at 1904, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 504; see also Patton v.
Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1035-40 (1984) (extensive publicity prior to first trial does not prejudice
second trial four years later); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 302 (1977) (defendant must
show either trial atmosphere prejudicial or jury selection procedure permitted inference of
actual prejudice); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799-803 (1975) (defendant must show
publicity actually prejudiced jurors or caused pervasive hostility). Precedents distinguish between claims that the individual jurors might be biased from exposure to pretrial publicity, and
the separate problem of a corruptive atmosphere causing a presumption of prejudice. See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1032 (voir dire testimony showed many jurors had forgotten publicity from
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the judge not to allow content questions on individual voir dire is highly
subjective.7 1 Whether pretrial publicity has rendered the trial "fundamentally unfair" is equally subjective because the burden of proof remains on the
defendant to show that seated jurors were actually unable to "lay aside"
72
knowledge gained prior to trial.
By determining that publicity in Mu'Mn was not as widespread as in another case,7" the Court further highlighted the subjective nature of this analysis.74 The Court acknowledged that pretrial publicity can raise the
presumption that jurors' claims of impartiality are not to be believed, but
stated this was not such a case. 7 5 As a consequence of the majority's depen-

prior trial); Murphy, 421 U.S. at 797-99 (huge wave of public passion requires presumption of
prejudice); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (trial judge may use remedies such
as sequestration to protect jurors from publicity); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)
(pretrial reports of inadmissible evidence not prejudicial where five day voir dire).
71. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, I II S. Ct. at 1907, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 508 (defendant must
show "manifest error"); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 355-57 (publicity inherently prejudicial where
reporters in courtroom and judge failed to take protective measures); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 544 (1965) (televising courtroom proceedings prejudicial even though no identifiable prejudice); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726-27 (1963) (due process denied where defendant's confession televised prior to trial). Compare Simmons v. Lockhart, 814 F.2d 504, 508-11
(8th Cir. 1987) (no presumption of bias in case headlined "largest mass murder in Arkansas
history," despite pervasive publicity) with Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1540 (1 th Cir.
1985) (inflammatory pretrial publicity pervasive to presume prejudice in rural Georgia
community).
72. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 1906, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 508 (trial judge has
broad discretion); United States v. Mercer, 853 F.2d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 1988) (trial court properly denied motion for change of venue, because no prejudicial publicity for six months before
selection of jury); United States v. Doggett, 821 F.2d 1049, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1987) (no prejudice where prospective juror commented on his inability to be impartial due to media exposure
because juror not chosen); United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 971-72 (3d Cir. 1985)
(defendant given fair trial despite series of articles entitled "Cops on the Take" because lack of
impartiality not shown); United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1047 (4th Cir. 1977) (trial
court erred in refusing individual voir dire pertaining to capacity to serve).
73. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (defendant deserves verdict based solely on evidence at
trial).
74. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1906-07, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 507-08 (publicity
not so wide-spread as in Irvin); Willard v. Pearson, 823 F.2d 1141, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 1987)
(publicity dealing mostly with eccentricities of victim does not satisfy burden of showing actual
juror bias); United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 380-81 (10th Cir. 1986) (article about
defendants' prior criminal activity and membership in white supremacy organization not prejudicial); United States v. Fuentes-Coba, 738 F.2d 1191, 1195 (11th Cir. 1984) (prejudice not
shown by polling of jurors where none gave affirmative responses to questions during voir dire
about possible bias).
75. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at __, III S. Ct. at 1906, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 508; see Dobbert, 432
U.S. at 302 (defendant must prove either trial atmosphere inherently prejudicial or jury selection procedure permitted inference of actual prejudice); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 355-57 (publicity inherently prejudicial where trial judge allowed reporters to dominate courtroom); Estes,
381 U.S. at 544 (televised courtroom proceedings prejudicial, despite no indication defendants
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dence on vague guidelines such as "unfair trial," lower courts will reach
inconsistent results when considering to what extent publicity may prejudice
the proceedings.7 6
By rejecting the "substantial possibility" standard of the American Bar
Association, the Supreme Court failed to recognize an accepted method of
conducting voir dire in light of pretrial publicity.7 7 While conceding that
questions about pretrial publicity can be helpful, the Court ruled that they
are not required because peremptory challenges are not constitutionally
mandated.' Such reasoning is not relevant because typically the defend-

actually prejudiced); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726-27 (due process denied when defendant's confession televised before trial). Compare Simmons, 814 F.2d at 509-11 (no presumption of bias
where murder in rural Arkansas county called "largest mass murder in Arkansas history")
with Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1540 (pretrial publicity so pervasive as to create presumed prejudice
in rural Georgia community).
76. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1907, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 508 (no "wave of
public passion"); see also Mercer, 853 F.2d at 633 (judge denied motion for change of venue
because no prejudicial publicity immediately preceding trial); Doggett, 821 F.2d at 1050-51
(defendant not denied fair trial when prospective juror commented on inability to be impartial
due to media exposure); United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1295 (7th Cir. 1986) (due
process did not require evidentiary hearing on publicity when judge assessed impact through
voir dire); De Peri, 778 F.2d at 971-72 (trial court decision affirmed in determining fair trial
where police officers' alleged extortion covered in magazine series called "Cops on the Take");
Compare Simmons, 814 F.2d at 508-11 (no presumption of bias despite existence of pervasive
publicity in case involving murder of four people in rural Arkansas called "largest mass murder in Arkansas history") with Coleman, 778 F.2d at 1540 (inflammatory publicity so pervasive as to create presumed prejudice in trial of defendant who murdered six members of family
in rural Georgia community).
77. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1908, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (standard
stricter than constitutionally required); Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 535 N.E.2d 217, 220
(Mass. 1989) ("substantial risk of extraneous influences" requires change of venue); Iowa v.
Walters, 426 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Iowa 1988) (substantial likelihood is test); Illinois v. Gendron,
243 N.E.2d 208, 211 (111. 1968) (reasonable apprehension defendant will be deprived of fair
trial); see also Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Pretrial Publicity in Criminal Case as Ground for
Change of Venue, 33 A.L.R. 3d 17, 38-39 (1970) (language varies in courts from "reasonable

likelihood" to "substantial likelihood"). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 8 (2d ed. 1980 and supp. 1986) (covering pretrial

publicity).
78. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 1907-08, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 509. See Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) (right of peremptory challenge not constitutionally guaranteed); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (right of peremptory challenge only impaired if defendant does not receive what state law provides); see also James G. Bonebrake,
Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments-The Lost Role of the Peremptory Challenge in Securing an Accused's Right to an Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 899, 899
(1988) (loss of challenge because of error in removing venireman for cause does not constitute
reversible error on Sixth Amendment claim); Karen T. Grisez, Note, Ross v. Oklahoma: A
Reversal of the Reversible-ErrorStandard in Death-QualificationCases, 38 CATH. U. L. REV.
881, 881 (1989) (Court erred in abandoning critical test of examining jury as a whole because
peremptory challenges developed to secure Sixth Amendment guarantees). But see Gray v.
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ant's claim that publicity has prejudiced a trial is based on the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments, not a peremptory challenge deficiency.7 9 The Court
distinguishes between state courts and federal courts but points out it has
supervisory authority over state courts only on constitutional issues."0 The
distinction is moot, in as much as the very issue in this case was whether
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment
requires content questioning during voir dire."' The ruling in Mu'Mn
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 660-661 (1987) (rejecting idea that inquiry should be whether jury
composition affected as a whole).
79. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at
I,Ill S. Ct. at 1907, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 509 (voir dire aids in
peremptory challenges); Ross, 487 U.S. at 85 (well settled that Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee defendant on trial for his life right to impartial jury); Harris v. Pulley, 885
F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988) (standards governing change of venue derive from Due Process
Clause which safeguards defendant's Sixth Amendment right); Bailey v. Delaware, 490 A.2d
158, 162 (Del. 1984) (Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments provide guarantees); see also Groppi
v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 510 (1971) (on at least one occasion Court held that only change of
venue constitutionally sufficient to assure impartial jury which Fourteenth Amendment guarantees); Maine v. Addington, 518 A.2d 449, 451 (Me. 1986) (Fourteenth Amendment may
require change of venue if invidious pretrial publicity); Norman L. McGill, Note, JurorImpartiality-PrejudicialPublicity: The Supreme Court Makes the Doctrine of Presumed Prejudice
Unavailableto State Defendants on Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Patton v. Yount, 1985 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 565, 566 n.13 (defendant usually contends due process violation by writ of habeas
corpus proceeding under Fourteenth Amendment). But see South Dakota v. Luna, 378
N.W.2d 229, 236 (S.D. 1985) (Sixth Amendment right infringed); Buxton S. Copeland, Note,
Criminal Procedure-Motionfor Change of Venue-In Search of a Guiding Light-State v.
Jerrett, 7 CAMPBELL L. REV. 73, 79-80 (1984) (due to constitutional nature of this area of law,
state courts bound by U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
80. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -., 111 S. Ct. at 1903-04, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 503-04. The Court in
Mu'Min noted that it has supervisory power over federal courts. See Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (adequacy of voir dire not easily subject to review); Aldridge,
283 U.S. at 311 (court failed to ask question which "covered the subject"); Connors v. United
States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895) (suitable inquiry permissible but much left to discretion). The
Mu'Min Court distinguished state courts in which the Court's authority is limited to enforcing
the Constitution. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -., 111 S. Ct. at 1903-04, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 503-04; see
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986) (capital defendant entitled to racial bias questions);
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1976) (no significant likelihood of bias where black
defendant and white victim); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (black defendant entitled to racial bias questions).
81. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 1904, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 505 (petitioner
asserted Fourteenth Amendment right to content questions); Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189
(inquiry as to racial prejudice may be required by Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 311 (reversible error under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for Court
not to ask about racial bias); Connors, 158 U.S. at 413 (inquiry permissible to determine if
juror holds opinion or prejudice); see also Stanton D. Krauss, Comment, Representing the
Community: A Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64
IND. L.J. 617, 617 (1989) (voir dire practice should consider constitutional limitations);
Michael J. Whellan, Note, What's Happened to Due ProcessAmong the States? PretrialPublicity and Motions for Change of Venue in Criminal Proceedings, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 175, 176
(1990) (fair trial requires jurors be free of outside influences). Compare United States v. Hill,
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leaves too much discretion to the trial judge because the lack of minimum
standards will result in the application of varying standards among the jurisdictions.82 The absence of minimum standards also leaves the defendant no
clear basis for appeal.83 Because of the ample discretion accorded the trial
judge, an appellate judge will be reluctant to find
"manifest error" where the
84
trial judge found the voir dire method "fair."
The premise that where pretrial publicity may prejudice trial a defendant
has a constitutional right to determine whether individual jurors are impartial, was articulated in Justice Marshall's dissent in Mu'Min.8 5 Because the

738 F.2d 152, 153 (6th Cir. 1984) (per se reversible error when court refused to ask whether
jurors could presume innocence) with United States v. Miller, 758 F.2d 570, 571-73 (1 1th Cir.
1985) (no need for specific questions when voir dire jury as whole).
82. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 195 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (would allow trial
judge to determine on case by case basis instead of adopting rule); Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 594
(Constitution does not entitle accused to have specific questions posed during voir dire); cf
Turner,476 U.S. at 36-37 (court required to ask racial bias questions); Silverthorne v. United
States, 400 F.2d 627, 639 (9th Cir. 1968) (content questioning required). See generally Scott
Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right to an ImpartialJury: Resolving the
Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730 n.5 (1985) (same standards
for federal trials as for state trials); Norman L. McGill, Note, JurorImpartiality--Prejudicial
Publicity: The Supreme Court Makes the Doctrine of Presumed Prejudice Unavailable to State
Defendants on Habeas Corpus Proceedings, Patton v. Yount, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J. 565, 579-80
(latitude given trial court grants judge almost unlimited discretion).
83. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1907, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 508-09 (Court
determined that because Mu'Min lived in big city pretrial publicity was not prejudicial); Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038-40 (only trial judge knows which of various answers given were with
greatest "certainty and comprehension"). The Court interprets the "fair support" statute to
support the idea that no decision should be overturned unless there is "manifest error." Patton, 467 U.S. at 1032 n.7; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988) (determination of state court shall be
presumed correct). By refusing to clarify minimum standards required for due process, the
Supreme Court encourages states to maintain their various interpretations of what due process
requires. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1034-35; Brecheen v. Oklahoma, 485 U.S. 909, 911-12 (1988)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (in wake of Supreme Court "vacuum of constitutional precedent"
states have diverged); Gendron, 243 N.E.2d at 211 (reasonable apprehension standard); Lutes
v. Mississippi, 517 So.2d 541, 545 (Miss. 1987) (reasonably likely standard).
84. See United States v. Glaze, 866 F.2d 253, 254 (8th Cir. 1989) (jury not prejudiced by
ongoing news coverage about defendant being "serial killer"); United States v. Beniach, 825
F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (7th Cir. 1987) (juror's knowledge of guilty pleas through publicity not
prejudicial when juror claimed impartiality and defendant made no showing of actual prejudice); De Per.i, 778 F.2d at 971-72 (newspaper's series of articles entitled "Cops on the Take"
not prejudicial); United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (pretrial reports of
evidence later found inadmissible not prejudicial).
85. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -., III S. Ct. at 1912, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 514 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging that the Court has long recognized that pretrial publicity may
deny defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by impartial jury); Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 595
n.6 (Due Process Clause likewise guarantees defendant's right to fair trial); Sheppard, 384 U.S.
at 363 (explaining that defendant did not have to show prejudice because pretrial publicity so
extensive); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 727 (refusing to review voir dire because publicity presumed to
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burden is on the defendant to prove prejudice, there is ample reason to allow
meaningful examination of jurors.8 6 The proposal that content questioning
be a part of voir dire in publicity cases is apt because there is no way to
adequately determine if a juror can be impartial without asking probing
87
questions individually.
Justice Marshall noted that by finding out what jurors had read or heard
about the case before trial, the court would be able to determine whether a
juror is impartial as a matter of law.8 8 In prior cases, 89 the Court ruled that
determining whether the defendant had been afforded due process was a
mixed question of law and fact.' The dissent in Mu'Min also recognized
that because jurors may be confused as to what "impartiality" means, asking
jurors specifically what they know about the case and what impressions they
had formed would lend depth to the trial court's finding of impartiality. 9'

prejudice trial); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722 (conclusions of our justice system should be reached
only by evidence and argument in open court, not outside influence).
86. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -_, 111 S. Ct. at 1912, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (we have never
specified what type voir dire required); Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031 (recognizing problem of pretrial publicity but decision based on particular facts in case). Justice Marshall commented that
the Court has never addressed in "any great detail" procedures necessary to protect defendant's right to impartial jury. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1912, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 515
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 500
(1984) (appeals court properly declined to second guess judge).
87. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1913, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (only firm conclusion from our impartial-jury jurisprudence is that juror's own
assurances cannot be dispositive of defendant's rights); see also Murphy, 421 U.S. at 800 (juror's assurances cannot be dispositive of defendant's rights); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
221-22 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (juror may have interest in concealing bias, or be
unaware of it); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 375 (1972) (human pride suggests
negative answer to whether juror could not be fair and impartial).
88. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at
lll
1, S. Ct. at 1913, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 516 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (content questioning necessary to determine whether type and extent of publicity
juror exposed to would disqualify juror as matter of law); Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031 n.6 (question mixed one of law and fact); Murphy, 421 U.S. at 798-99 (constitutional standard requires
impartial "indifferent" jurors); Rideau, 373 U.S. at 726 (presumed prejudice mandated change
in venue).
89. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723 (whether jurors' opinions are prejudicial is question of
"mixed law and fact").
90. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1914, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 517 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (content questioning necessary to determine if juror should be disqualified as matter of law); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) (searching questions
should be asked); Ham, 409 U.S. at 532 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (without such inquiry defendant's rights rendered meaningless); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728
(no doubt each juror would claim he would be fair and impartial, requiring such a declaration
before "one's fellows is often its father"); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1950)
(preservation of opportunity to discover bias is guarantee of fair trial).
91. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -., III S. Ct. at 1914, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 517 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (because jurors are often not aware of prejudice, content questioning lends depth to
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Content questioning lends credibility to the trial court's finding because a
background of impartiality develops which facilitates accurate fact finding.9 2
The dissent's rationale is supported by the fact that many jurisdictions have
initiated procedures which specify content questioning in the presence of
pretrial publicity.9 3 Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Marshall concluded that
the presence of such minimum standards in many jurisdictions indicates that
such a requirement would not be burdensome as the majority suggests. 94
Justice Kennedy's three-step approach falls short of requiring trial judges
to include content questions in voir dire, but does at least recommend some
procedures for use in analyzing pretrial publicity cases.9 5 Justice Kennedy's

court's finding); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2) (1988) (court may excuse prospective juror for
failure to render impartial service); Smith, 455 U.S. at 222 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (juror
may be unaware of own bias); Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802 (court may ignore juror's claims of
impartiality and draw inference of prejudice); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728 (court may infer prejudice
when many jurors admit prejudice); Alice M. Padawer-Singer & Allen H. Barton, The Impact
of PretrialPublicity on Juror's Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA-A CRITICAL
OVERVIEW 125, 135 (Rita J. Simon ed., 1975) (jurors exposed to inadmissible evidence
outside courtroom found defendant guilty in vast majority of cases); Hans Ziesel & Shari S.
Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury & Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal
District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 528-29 (1978) (experiment suggests voir dire as conducted not sufficient to identify prejudiced jurors).
92. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 11I S. Ct. at 1915, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 517 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (individual voir dire including content questioning would lend credibility to process); Patton, 467 U.S at 1038 (determination one of credibility); Nebraska Press Ass'n. 427
U.S. at 547 (jurors exposed to information traditionally thought uniquely destructive); NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK § 10.03[3] at 10-33 (2d ed. 1983) (voir dire questions give
understanding of lay people's reaction to parties, issues and facts of case).
93. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1916, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 519 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (numerous federal and states courts have adopted procedures for screening juror
bias that majority disparages as intrusive); United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 196 (5th Cir.
1978) (content questioning required); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 67 (3d Cir.
1971) (content questioning and sequestered voir dire); Silverthorne, 400 F.2d at 639 (content
questioning correct procedure); Louisiana v. Goodson, 412 So.2d 1077, 1081 (La. 1982) (content questioning and sequestered voir dire); Tennessee v. Claybrook, 736 S.W.2d 95, 99-100
(Tenn. 1987) (sequestered voir dire).
94. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 1916, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 519 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (administrative convenience argument gratuitous); United States v. Harris, 542
F.2d 1283, 1295 (7th Cir. 1976) (sequestered voir dire); United States v. Colabella, 448 F.2d
1299, 1303 (2d Cir. 1971) (sequestered voir dire); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8-3.5(a) (2d ed. 1980) (content questioning required where substantial
likelihood of prejudice); Judicial Conference of the United States, Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial"
Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519, 532-33 (1980).
95. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 1915, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 517 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (instant case does not fall this category where inflammatory publicity causes presumption of prejudice); see Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036-40 (distinguishing between dual inquiry
whether jurors actually prejudiced or trial setting caused presumption of prejudice); Murphy,
421 U.S. at 799-803 (inflammatory trial atmosphere required presumption of prejudice).
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assertion that the atmosphere at trial had not risen to a "carnival" level
because of publicity still leaves it to a trial judge to subjectively decide what
constitutes a "carnival" atmosphere.9 6 However, Justice Kennedy's requirement that jurors be questioned individually rather than en masse about bias
would provide for more meaningful examination
during voir dire than the
97
group questioning approved by the majority.

By setting such an unreviewable standard for voir dire examination where
pretrial publicity may prejudice trial, the Supreme Court has assured that
many accused will receive unequal justice in United States courts. Defendants in jurisdictions that apply the more rigid "inherent prejudice" test will
require the defendant to prove that the trial setting was so "carnival" like in
nature that a fair trial was impossible, or prove that a seated juror was actually unable to remain impartial. Defendants tried in jurisdictions using the
"reasonable likelihood" or "substantial likelihood" test will receive justice
based on the totality of circumstances, which relieves their burden of proof
substantially. Without a doubt, there is valid support for the notion that
trial judges should have ample discretion in conducting voir dire, but the
Supreme Court's refusal to formulate reviewable standards for voir dire has
deprived defendants of equal justice under the law. The American Bar Association's standard that where there is a "substantial possibility" that pretrial publicity may prejudice trial, requiring individual voir dire including
content questions would provide minimum guidelines to federal and state
courts alike. Had the Supreme Court adopted this standard, the gap of disparity between the jurisdictions would have been narrowed because the
courts would look to the totality of the circumstances to make a determination of impartiality.
Karen A. Cusenbary

96. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -I,111 S. Ct. at 1917, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 521 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031-35 (inquiry as to whether "carnival" atmosphere present);
Murphy, 421 U.S. at 797-99 (publicity caused "carnival" atmosphere).
97. See Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at -_, 111 S. Ct. at 1919, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 523 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (group questioning inadequate); Jordan v. Lippman, 763 F.2d 1265, 1279-81 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (individual voir dire required where newspapers carried sensational reports); Davis,
583 F.2d at 196 (individual voir dire required where coverage inflammatory and emphasized
racial overtones); see also John A. Burgess, Note, The Efficacy of a Change of Venue in Protecting a Defendant's Right to an Impartial Jury, 42 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 925, 935 (1967)
(change of venue is subordinate to procedures which insure impartial jury); Constance M.
Jones, Comment, Appellate Review of CriminalChange of Venue Rulings: The Demise of California's Reasonable Likelihood Standard, 71 CAL. L. REv. 703, 718 (1983) (Maine made clear
that town population not determinative in finding prejudice).
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